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On the Relationship Between Aquaculture 
and Reduction Fisheries 
Frank Asche and Sigbjørn Tveterås 1
Recently, there has been a growing concern that increased aquaculture production 
poses an environmental threat to the species targeted in so-called reduction fisheries, 
the main source for fishmeal. The argument is that increased aquaculture production 
leads to higher feed demand, and then presumably to higher fishing effort in these 
fisheries. In this paper we address whether aquaculture production threatens 
sustainability of such fisheries. First, we ask under which management regimes can 
increased demand pose a threat to the species in question? Second, we investigate what 
is the market for fishmeal; is fishmeal a unique product or is it part of the larger market 
for protein meals which includes Soyameal? This is an important issue since the market 
structure for fishmeal is a key factor in determining whether increased aquaculture 
production can affect fishmeal prices, and thereby increase fishing pressure in 
reduction fisheries. 
1. Introduction
During the last two decades global aquaculture production has increased 
substantially because of new and intensive farming techniques.2 These 
developments have increased productivity of new high-valued species like 
shrimps and salmon, on the one hand, and traditional aquaculture species like 
carp, on the other. The intensification of aquaculture production has, however, 
led to both local and global environmental concerns. The most important local 
concerns include discharges from farming sites, destruction of local habitat, and 
spreading of pathogens (Naylor et al., 2000). The limited geographical extent of 
the local issues implies that they can, at least in principle, be solved by local 
regulation (Asche, Guttormsen and Tveterås, 1999).3 The global concern is that 
growing aquaculture production will increase fishing pressure on wild-caught 
species that are subsequently processed into fishmeal, and consequently 
threaten the sustainability of these reduction fisheries (i.e., the fisheries targeted 
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2  Traditional or extensive aquaculture differs from intensive or industrial aquaculture in scale and production 
technology. In particular, in extensive aquaculture the fish is not fed, but consumes whatever nature 
provides at the location. 
3  Several of these potential negative externalities will be internalised by the farmers, as they also affect their 
productivity (Asche, Guttormsen and Tveterås, 1999; Tveterås, 2002). 
for fishmeal and fish oil production). This problem, often labelled the ‘fishmeal 
trap’, occurs since marine proteins are important ingredients in the diet for 
cultured seafood (Naylor et al., 2000). This is an interesting observation, since 
it implies that the aquaculture industry creates environmental problems via its 
input market. As the market for fishmeal is global this is then a global problem. 
Limited availability of marine protein subsequently represents a biological 
constraint for the growth of intensive aquaculture production. 
In this paper we investigate to what extent the ‘fishmeal trap’ associated with 
aquaculture growth represents an environmental problem. We decompose the 
question into two key issues, one pertaining to the regulation of capture 
fisheries and one pertaining to the market for protein meals. If increasing 
demand for fishmeal increases fishing effort, growth of aquaculture production 
can lead to unsustainable capture fisheries. However, this requires that 
aquaculture depends on fishmeal in fish feed, so that aquaculture growth 
actually increases total demand for fishmeal. 
We begin by discussing how increased demand affects a fish stock under 
different management regimes in a bio-economic model. There are a number of 
management forms in the world’s fisheries. These generally fall into three main 
groups: open access, optimal management (or sole-ownership), and restricted 
open access. We investigate the effect of increased demand for wild fish with 
these three benchmark groups, and show that the effect critically depends on the 
management system. We then relate this to the actual management situation for 
the reduction fisheries. 
The next step is to consider the market for protein meals because the extent to 
which increasing aquaculture production increases fishing pressure also 
depends on whether there are close substitutes for fishmeal. In particular, if 
there are close substitutes for fishmeal, the effect on the fishmeal price because 
of increased demand from aquaculture will be limited, and accordingly give 
little incentive to increase fishing pressure. Most of the world’s fishmeal has 
traditionally been used as a protein source in livestock feeds, primarily pig and 
poultry.4 This suggests that fishmeal is a part of the much larger protein meal 
market. In aquaculture proteins of a marine origin are often regarded as 
superior. However, as in livestock feeds, there are alternative protein sources. 
Most cultured marine and freshwater species can use at least some vegetable 
meals such as soyameal in their diet, and quite a few cultured species like carp 
and tilapia are herbivore in nature. Fishmeal is, nevertheless, increasingly used 
in compound aquaculture feeds to increase growth, for carnivore, omnivore, and 
also herbivore species. It is therefore of substantial interest whether fishmeal is 
a unique product or a part of the larger market for protein meals, including 
that of soyameal. This is important because the market structure is 
instrumental in determining how increased demand for feed from aquaculture 
can affect the price for fishmeal. 
4  A small part is also used for human consumption. 
2. Increased Demand and Fisheries Management
This section first gives a brief overview of the world’s industrial fisheries. We 
then turn to a simple bio-economic model to illustrate the importance of 
management regime when demand increases, finally discussing the state of the 
most important industrial fisheries in this light. 
2.1 Industrial fisheries 
The world’s reduction fisheries are mainly based on fisheries of small pelagic 
species.5 Pelagic fish are used both for human consumption and for reduction, 
i.e. fishmeal and fish oil, but certain species are only fit for reduction due to 
their consistency, often being small, bony, and oily. 
Normal yearly catches destined for fishmeal production amounted to 
approximately 30 million MT (metric tons) in the 1990s, yielding an average of 
6-7 million MT fishmeal. The main reduction fishery nations in 1997 are shown 
in Figure 1 with their respective share of global fishmeal production. 
Based on their rich fisheries of Peruvian anchoveta, Chilean jack mackerel, and 
South American pilchard, Chile and Peru alone account for over 50% of global 
fishmeal production. Other substantial producers are the Nordic countries, 
Denmark, Iceland, and Norway. Combined, their fisheries provide raw material 
for approximately 15% of global fishmeal production.  
A characteristic of the pelagic fisheries is that while the quantity going directly 
to human consumption stays relatively stable, the “surplus” that goes to 
reduction can vary substantially (Hempel, 1999). Thus, in years when the 
catches are low, such as El Niño periods, the fishmeal industry is depressed. 
Most of the pelagic fisheries have also been described as fully exploited or 
over-exploited by the FAO (UN Food and Agricultural Organization, Grainger 
and Garcia, 1996). A significant expansion of the global fishmeal production, 
beyond the 6-7 million MT that is normally produced, is therefore not likely 
unless prices for fishmeal increase substantially.6 
5  Pelagic fish are free migrating fish species that inhabit the surface waters, as opposed to demersal fish that 
inhabit the sea floor. 
6  In the short term, greater yields could be taken if prices increased, although these would be unsustainable 
and lead to lower long-term sustainable yields, as illustrated in Section 2.2. 
Figure 1: World Fishmeal Production in 1997  
(Fishmeal Exporters Organisation) 
2.2 A simple bio-economic model 
Let us then turn to the effect of increased demand in a fishery. We use the static 
Gordon-Schaefer model, since introducing dynamics do not add essentially to 
our discussion of why increased demand for a species might pose a threat to fish 
stocks.7 Textbook versions of this model cover the two most common 
institutional regimes in the fisheries economics literature, open access and 
optimal management (Homans and Wilen, 1997).8 In an open access fishery 
there is no management and the fish stock represents a common pool resource. 
If the fishery is optimally regulated in this model, a setting that is often 
represented as a fishery regulated by a sole-owner, the discount rate is assumed 
to be zero. In addition to these two institutional regimes we also consider a 
regulated open access setting, since this is the most commonly observed 
management structure in the world’s fisheries. A Total Allowable Catch (TAC) 
is used as an example of a regulated open access fishery, but alternative 
regulations like input factor restrictions or taxes can be used in place of or in 
combination with, a TAC. In a regulated open access regime one or more inputs 
or outputs are restricted, so that the fishery is generally regarded as biologically 
safe. However, one pays little attention to the economic incentives in the 
7  Accounting for dynamics will not change the open access equilibrium, but will shift the maximum 
economic yield equilibrium to account for the effect of the discount rate that is not included in the static 
model.  
8  Good representations of this model can be found in a number of places, e.g. Anderson (1986), Hannesson, 
(1993) or Munro and Scott (1985). 
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fishery, as one typically observes over-capacity and rent dissipation. This is 
what is known as a Class II common property problem in fisheries management 
(Munro and Scott, 1985). For simplicity we do not let the regulator be an 
endogenous part of the model, as in Homans and Wilen (1997), but let the quota 
be set exogenously. Such assumptions should be unproblematic since the size of 
the quota tends to be dominated by biological rather than economic 
considerations.9 
The net natural growth in the biomass is 
)/1()( kxrxxF −= (1) 
where x  is the biomass, r  is the intrinsic growth rate and k  is environmental 
carrying capacity. This function also gives the sustainable yield for different 
levels of the biomass. The value of the sustainable yield can be found by 
multiplying equation (1) with a price p, giving the sustainable revenue curve, 
TR. We will here, as in most analyses, assume that the price is given from a 
world market. This is reasonable for species that are used for fishmeal 
production, since the value of the end product does not vary much with varieties 
of pelagic species used. 
Harvest H  is given as 
ExH αγ= (2) 
where y  is a catchability coefficient, a  gives the strength of the stock effect 
and E  is fishing effort. The fishery is in equilibrium when growth of fish stock 
equals harvest, ( ) HxF = . 
Fishing cost is 
αγxcHcEC /==  (3) 
where c  is the unit cost of fishing effort. 
Total profits or rent are 
cEpH −=Π (4) 
This model has two equilibria: Under open access all rents are dissipated as in 
all competitive industries and the equilibrium condition is accordingly that price 
equals average cost, giving a biomass at the level ∞x . Under optimal 
management, the harvest is set by maximizing equation (4), giving the 
equilibrium condition that price should equal marginal cost, leading to a 
9  It may be worthwhile to note that Individual Transferable Quota (ITQ) schemes can also be regarded as 
restricted open access. The main difference between ITQ’s and other restricted access schemes is that the 
fishermen’s incentives are changed from maximising their share of the catch to maximise profits for their 
share of the catch. 
biomass at the level 0x . In contrast to the standard competitive case, rents will 
be generated because of the biological production process. This is graphed in 
Figure 2, where the sustainable revenue curve, TR, is shown together with the 
cost curve, C. The cost curve is drawn in a linear fashion (i.e. assuming 1=α ), 
although in general it will be non-linear and monotonically increasing. The 
qualitative implications are therefore not affected by this linearity, but the 
distance between the optimal and the open access equilibrium will differ. As 
one can see, 0xx <∞ , and one can also show that effort in an open access 
fishery is higher than in an optimally managed fishery, i.e. 0EE >∞ . Note that 
since the harvested quantity is a function of the net growth of the fish stock, this 
gives a backward bending supply schedule since if a small stock is reduced, net 
growth is also reduced. Under regulated open access, a quota Q determines total 
harvest. The quota is typically determined by biological considerations. This 
will then lead to a biomass at some target level, Qx , which under our 
assumptions are set without any economic considerations. In Figure 2 an 
arbitrarily set quota is inserted at the level, Qx . 
Figure 2: Solutions for Three Different Regulatory Regimes 
Assume then that the price increases due to increased demand in the world 
market. The higher price increases the value of the natural growth of the fish 
stock and the harvest, as introduced in Figure 3 with the new sustainable 
revenue schedule, TR’. When the fishery is in open access and when it is 
optimally managed, the increased value of the fish will increase the effort in the 
fishery and decrease the biomass. Under open access, one will normally operate 
at biomass levels lower than k/2, the biomass associated with Maximum 
Sustainable Yield (MSY), which traditionally has been the management 
criterion advocated by biologists. This puts the supply on the backward bending 
part of the supply schedule. A higher price will then lower landings and put 
further pressure on the stocks. At some point cost will prevent more effort, but 
in many fisheries this might be at very low levels of biomass. In particular, 
pelagic stocks with weak stock effects (i.e. an α  parameter close to zero) can 
be driven down to very low levels.10 This is important here, since many of the 
stocks targeted in reduction fisheries are pelagic. 
Figure 3: Effects of a Price Increase on Fishing Pressure 
In the case with optimal management, the size of the landings responds to the 
increased prices. The biomass will, however, always be higher than k/2, the 
level associated with Maximum Sustainable Yield (MSY). One can therefore 
hardly argue that the fishery poses a threat to the stock under optimal 
management.11 If the fishery is regulated by a quota that is set without paying 
attention to economic factors, the quota remains the same when demand 
changes, the biomass remains the same, but the value of the catch increases. 
The obvious conclusion is that if the fishery is not allowed to respond to 
economic incentives the increased demand for reduction species will not have 
much effect, other than perhaps depressing season length.12 
10 See e.g. Bjørndal (1987; 1988) for a discussion of such fisheries. The model as represented cannot handle 
cases where the stock effect is zero, as harvesting cost then will be independent of stock size. However, it is 
unlikely that the stock effect will be zero in any relevant case, as there will always be some search costs. 
11 However, when dynamics and a positive discount rate is introduced, one can show that for stocks with very 
low growth rates it may be economically optimal to drive the stocks to very low levels or extinction (Clark, 
1973). Some of the big whales seem to be the only candidates for species that it might be economically 
optimal to drive to extinction, but even for them this is doubtful. Hence, this is not a very relevant scenario. 
12 See Homans and Wilen (1997) on effects of regulated open access fisheries using season length as the 
management tool. 
Accordingly, the real problem is in the open access scenario, since increased 
demand for a species in this scenario might lead to serious depletion of the 
stock, and will increase the risk of extinction. The model outlined here allows 
the stock to be driven down to very low levels, although not to become extinct 
as long as there are costs associated with the harvesting process. It is clear, 
however, that with very low stock levels the species also becomes substantially 
more vulnerable to changes in other factors like water temperature, salinity, etc. 
that are not accounted for in a bio-economic model. In more general biological 
models, one may also increase the probability of extinction. 
2.3 The management of industrial fisheries 
The analysis above indicates that increased demand for any species is mainly a 
problem if the fishery is not managed, i.e. is operated as an open access fishery. 
What then are the management regimes for the most important pelagic stocks 
used in industrial fisheries? As noted above, most of the world’s reduction 
fisheries are carried out in relatively few countries, with Peru and Chile as the 
most important (see Figure 1). The stocks of Peruvian anchoveta and Chilean 
jack mackerel have shown their vulnerability both to the weather phenomenon 
El Niño and poor fisheries management. Fisheries management has improved 
over the last decade though, with increasingly stricter regulations on inputs.13 
The most important tools used in Chile and Peru today are TACs, limited 
access, input factor regulations and closures that are imposed on the fisheries in 
certain periods and certain areas. The industrial fisheries in the Nordic countries 
are regulated by TACs and other additional restrictions. Nevertheless, the 
overall state of the fisheries for reduction in the Nordic countries has improved 
substantially after herring stock collapses in the late 1960s and early 1970s, and 
several of these stocks have been rebuilt to pre-collapse levels. In the US, the 
Menhaden fishery is the main industrial fishery, and is also regulated with a 
TAC. 
A first glance indicates that the most important pelagic fisheries are regulated so 
that over-fishing is prevented, and accordingly open access is not a correct 
description of these fisheries. However, quotas tend to be high and one may 
often question whether the state of the fish stocks is the main priority when the 
quotas are set. Hence, it is not clear that the situation is very different from what 
it would prevail under open access. Many of these fisheries might, as such, be 
good examples of Homans and Wilen’s (1997) notion that management is an 
endogenous part of the fishery.14 Whether increased demand for fishmeal from a 
growing aquaculture industry is harmful for the fish stocks targeted in industrial 
fisheries will to a large extent depend on the market structure for fishmeal. 
13 For a discussion of fisheries management in Chile, see Peña-Torres (1997). 
14 It might be of interest to note that the open access equilibrium is also the equilibrium with the highest level 
of effort. Hence, if one is to maximise e.g. employment in a fishery, one is likely to end up very close to the 
open access equilibrium. Other objectives than rent maximisation can therefore lead to substantially higher 
quotas and lower biomass. Moreover, regional policy and employment are often important parts of fisheries 
policy, and therefore management. 
3. The market
We now turn to the market for fishmeal. What is the market is an important 
question since its extent largely determines whether increased demand from 
aquaculture will affect prices for fishmeal and thus the stock level in poorly 
managed fisheries. We start with a brief discussion of the world’s protein meal 
markets and then present our data. We go on to outline the methodology we use 
to delineate the market before we report and discuss the empirical results. 
3.1 The world’s protein meal markets and data 
The aquaculture industry is far from the only consumer of fishmeal. In Figure 4, 
the main sectors that use fishmeal are shown for 2000. 
Figure 4: Estimated Total Use of Fishmeal (Pike, 2000) 
As one can see pig and poultry production sectors jointly consume 53% of the 
production against 35% for aquaculture. Aquaculture is, nonetheless, up from 
17% in 1996, which represents a rapid expansion in fishmeal consumption. For 
most of the species that use fishmeal as feed, including aquaculture species, 
marine proteins are only a part of their diet. Other protein meals, with soyameal 
as the largest, make up a major share. If one looks at the total market for protein 
meals in Figure 5, global fishmeal production is minor compared to the total 
protein meal production. 
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Figure 5: World Production of Protein Meals 1996/97 (OW, 1999) 
There are two main explanations why fishmeal is used in livestock production. 
One explanation stresses the uniqueness of fishmeal. Fishmeal has a higher 
protein content than the other protein meals, and also has a different nutritional 
structure. In particular, this is the case with respect to amino acids that 
encourage growth and general health of animals. If fishmeal is unique, 
increased demand from aquaculture production for fishmeal is likely to increase 
prices, and therefore increase fishing pressure particularly from poorly managed 
fish stocks. The other explanation emphasises that fishmeal is cheap protein. If 
fishmeal is primarily demanded because it is cheap protein, one would expect a 
high degree of substitutability between fishmeal and other protein meals.15  
These two explanations have very different implications for the price formation 
process for fishmeal. If fishmeal is used because it is unique, the price of 
fishmeal should be determined by the demand and supply for fishmeal alone. 
However, if fishmeal is a close substitute for other protein meals, one would not 
expect the price of fishmeal to be greatly influenced by increased demand from 
aquaculture, since the price is determined by total demand for protein meals, of 
which demand from aquaculture occupies a small share. 
To determine fishmeal’s position in the protein meal market, we will investigate 
its relationship to soyameal, since soyameal is the largest of the vegetable 
15  Indications that these markets are integrated can be found in Vukina and Anderson (1993) and Gjerde 
(1989), who use soya futures to hedge fishmeal prices. 
Soybean meal
53 %
Rape and 
Sunflower
17 %
Fishmeal
4 %
Corn meals
9 %
Other meals
17 %
meals. The most obvious procedure would be to estimate demand equations and 
evaluate the cross-price elasticities. Although there exist exchanges that give 
price data of good quality at higher frequencies than annually, it is extremely 
difficult (if not impossible) to obtain reasonable quantity data, as in most global 
markets.16 Analysis of the relationships between prices is an alternative 
approach, even though it does not give as much information as demand 
analysis. However, it will allow us to determine whether the products are not 
substitutes, are perfect substitutes, or are imperfect substitutes. 
We use fishmeal and soyameal prices reported on a monthly basis from Europe 
and USA provided by the International Fish Oil and Meal Association, 
(IFOMA) (1998, 2000), in the period spanning January 1981 to April 1999.17 
The European prices are reported from Hamburg, and are denoted as Fish_Ham 
and Soya_Ham. In addition we use fishmeal prices from Atlanta, Georgia, 
denoted as Fish_Atl, and soyameal prices reported from Decatur, Illinois, 
denoted as Soya_Dec. The prices are shown in Figure 6. Note that the fishmeal 
prices are substantially higher than the soyameal prices. This is primarily 
because of the higher protein content. If one adjusts for the protein content, 
most of the difference disappears. The data period is interesting for at least two 
reasons: First, there have been some extreme situations for the fishmeal 
production in this period due to low raw material supply, including El Niños in 
1982-83, 1986-88, 1991-92 and finally in 1997-98, with the first and the last 
being the most severe. This makes it interesting to compare how the fishmeal 
and soyameal markets have interacted during these extreme periods. Second, 
the intensive aquaculture industry has experienced a tremendous growth in this 
period.18 If fishmeal is primarily demanded due to its special attributes, this 
should show up as fishmeal and soyameal being different market segments 
during this period. 
16 This has given rise to the so-called Armington bias when estimating import demand, when one cannot 
account for domestic use of domestic production (Winters, 1984). When analysing a global market rather 
than import demand to a single country, this problem becomes even more severe. 
17 The primary data sources are Feedstuff, Minneapolis, Minnesota for US price data, while the European 
price data originates from Oil World, The Weekly Forecasting and Information for Oilseeds, Oils, Fats and 
Oilmeals, Hamburg.  
18 It is of interest to note that in the papers considering aquaculture even as late as the mid 1980s, extensive 
farming technologies like ranching seems to have been regarded as more realistic than intensive 
aquaculture, see e.g. Anderson (1985) and Anderson and Wilen (1986). 
Figure 6: Monthly Fishmeal and Soybean Meal Prices (IFOMA, 1998, 2000) 
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Before carrying out a statistical analysis the time series properties of the data 
were investigated using Dickey-Fuller tests. The lag length was chosen as the 
highest significant lag. All prices are found to be non-stationary, but stationary 
in first differences (Table 1). Hence, cointegration analysis is the appropriate 
tool when investigating the relationships between the prices. 
Table 1: Augmented Dickey-Fuller (ADF) Tests for Unit Roots 
Variable Variable
in levels 
Variable in first 
differences 
Fish_Ham -3.2486 (5) -3.8090** (4) 
Soya_Ham -3.0824 (6) -4.7883** (5) 
Fish_Atl -2.9874 (10) -3.6270** (9) 
Soya_Dec -2.8635 (6) -4.8965** (5) 
Note: ** indicates significant at a 1% significance level. The number in parenthesis is the number 
of lags used in ADF test, which is chosen on the basis of the highest significant lag out of 12 lags 
that were used initially. The tests for variables in levels include a constant and a trend, while in 
first differences only a constant is included. 
3.2 Market integration 
Analysis of relationships between prices has a long history in economics, and 
many market definitions are based on the relationship between prices. For 
instance, in a book first published in 1838 Cournot states: “It is evident that an 
article capable of transportation must flow from the market where its value is 
less to the market where its value is greater, until the difference in value, from 
one market to the other, represents no more than the cost of transportation” 
(Cournot, 1971). While his definition of a market relates to geographical space, 
similar definitions are used for product space, where quality differences play the 
role of transport costs (Stigler and Sherwin, 1985; Sutton, 1991). The main 
arguments for why prices equalise within a market are either arbitrage or 
substitution. 
To provide the intuition behind price founded definitions of a market, we have 
sketched two market equilibria in Figure 7, where the prices are normalised to 
be identical initially. 
Figure 7: The Effects of a Positive Shift in the Demand for Good 1 
Assume then that there is a demand shock in market 1 that shifts the demand 
schedule to D1’. The price and quantity is then increased. What happens in 
market 2 depends on the degree of substitution for the consumers. If there is no 
substitution the price and quantity is not affected. If the goods are substitutes 
the demand schedule in market 2 is shifted outwards, and this will induce a 
spillover effect back to market 1 so that the demand schedule is shifted back 
from D1’. If the goods are imperfect substitutes, the relative prices will change. 
If the goods are perfect substitutes the spillover effect will leave demand for 
Good 1 at D1” and the demand for Good 2 at D2’’ so that the relative price 
between the two markets (goods) are equal again at p1’’= p2’’. This is often 
known as the Law of One Price (LOP). The strength of the influence of the 
shock in market 1 on market 2 is normally measured by cross price elasticities 
(which depend on both price and quantity). However, one can also look at the 
effect of the demand shock only from the price space. When the demand curve 
in market 1 shifts, the price changes. This can then have three types of effect for 
the price of the other good. If there is no substitution effect, the demand 
schedule does not shift and there is no movement in the price. If there is a 
substitution effect, the demand schedule for Good 2 shifts up, and the price 
shifts in the same direction as the price of the first product did. At most, the 
price of the other product can shift by the same percentage as the price of the 
first product, making the relative price constant so that the Law of One Price 
(LOP) holds.19 
The basic relationship to be investigated when analysing relationships between 
prices is 
tt pp 21 lnln βα += (5) 
where α  is a constant term (the log of a proportionality coefficient) that 
captures transportation costs and quality differences and β  gives the 
relationship between the prices.20 If 0=β , there is no relationship between the 
prices and therefore no substitution, while if 1=β  the Law of One Price holds, 
and the relative price is constant. In this case one can say that the goods in 
question are perfect substitutes. If β  is greater than zero, but not equal to one, 
there is a relationship between the prices, although the relative price is not 
constant, and the goods will be imperfect substitutes.21 
Equation (5) describes the situation when prices adjust immediately. There is, 
however, often a dynamic adjustment pattern; the dynamics can be accounted 
for by introducing lags of the two prices (Ravallion, 1986). It should be noted 
here that even when dynamics are introduced, the long-run relationship has the 
same form as equation (5). One can also show that there is a close relationship 
between market integration based on relationships between prices and 
aggregation via the composite commodity theorem (Asche, Bremnes and 
Wessells, 1999). In particular, if the Law of One Price holds the goods in 
question can be aggregated using the generalised commodity theorem of 
Lewbel (1996). 
Since the late 1980s, one has become aware that when prices are non-stationary, 
traditional econometric tools cannot be used, since normal inference theory 
breaks down (Engle and Granger, 1987). Cointegration analysis is then the 
appropriate tool. In early studies, single equation Engle and Granger tests 
(Engle and Granger, 1987) were used. However, as these have several 
weaknesses, the system based Johansen test (Johansen, 1988) is currently the 
preferred tool. For instance, the Engle and Granger test does not allow testing of 
the LOP hypothesis, while this is easily done using the Johansen test.22 Since 
our price series seems to be non-stationary, we will use this approach. 
19 For completeness one should also mention that if the demand schedule in market 2 shifts downwards, the 
two goods are complements. 
20 In most analysis it is assumed that transportation costs and quality differences can be treated as constant. 
However, this can certainly be challenged, see e.g. Goodwin, Grennes and Wohlgenant (1990), since if e.g. 
transportation costs are not constant, this can cause rejections of the Law of One Price. 
21 One can also show that if 0<β , this implies a complementary relationship between the two goods. 
22 Asche, Bremnes and Wessells (1999) is a recent example of this approach. 
The Johansen test is based on a vector autoregressive (VAR) system. A vector, 
tx , containing the N variables to be tested for cointegration is assumed to be 
generated by an unrestricted kth order vector auto-regression in the levels of the 
variables; 
tktktt e xxx ++++= −− ...11 (6) 
where each of the i  is a (N×N) matrix of parameters, µ  a constant term and 
),0(~ e iidt . The VAR system of equations in (6) written in error correction 
form (ECM) is; 
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with 
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and 
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Hence, K  is the long-run 'level solution' to (6). If tx  is a vector of I(1) 
variables, the left-hand side and the first (k-1) elements of (7) are I(0), and the 
last element of (7) is a linear combination of I(1) variables. Given the 
assumption on the error term, this last element must also be I(0); ktK −Π x ∼I(0). 
Hence, either tx  contains a number of cointegration vectors, or KΠ  must be a 
matrix of zeros. The rank of KΠ , r , determines how many linear combinations 
of tx  are stationary. If Nr = , the variables in levels are stationary; if 0=r  so 
that 0=Π K , none of the linear combinations are stationary. When Nr <<0 , 
there exist r  cointegration vectors, or r  stationary linear combinations of tx . 
In this case one can factorize K ;  ′=K , where both α and β  are (N×r) 
matrices, and β  contains the cointegration vectors (the error correcting 
mechanism in the system) and α  the adjustment parameters. Two 
asymptotically equivalent tests exist in this framework, the trace test and the 
maximum eigenvalue test, of which the trace test is considered the more robust 
(Cheung and Lai, 1993).23 
The Johansen procedure allows hypothesis testing on the coefficients α  and β , 
using likelihood ratio tests (Johansen and Juselius, 1990). In our case, it is 
restrictions on the parameters in the cointegration vectors β  that is of most 
interest. More specifically, in the bivariate case there are two price series in the 
23 The critical values for these tests are non-standard, and are tabulated in Johansen and Juselius (1990). 
tx  vector. Provided that the price series are cointegrated, the rank of β′α=Π is 
equal to 1 and α  and β  are 2×1 vectors. Of particular interest is the Law of 
One Price (LOP), which can be tested by imposing the restriction )1,1( ′−=β′ . 
In the multivariate case when all prices have the same stochastic trend, there 
must be 1−n  cointegration vectors in the system and each cointegration vector 
must sum to zero for the LOP to hold. It then follows from the identification 
scheme of Johansen and Juselius (1992) that each cointegration vector can be 
represented so that all but two elements are zero. When the identifying 
normalisation is imposed in the case with four price series, one representation of 
the matrix of cointegration vectors is: 












−
−
−
=
3
2
1
0
0
1
0
0
1
0
0
1
β
β
β
 (8) 
That is, one can represent the system with n  prices with 1−n  pairwise 
relationships. If all β  parameters are equal to 1, the LOP holds for the whole 
system. Hence, in a market delineation context, multivariate and bivariate tests 
can in principle provide the same information (Asche, Bremnes and Wessells, 
1999). However, the two approaches have different statistical merits. Using a 
multivariate approach, one is exposed to what Hendry (1995, p. 313) labels the 
"curse of dimensionality" in dynamic models, since with a limited number of 
observations and thereby limited degrees of freedom one has to choose between 
number of lags and number of variables. In bivariate analysis one is less 
exposed to this problem, but one may obtain several, possibly conflicting, 
estimates of the same long-run relationships. We will therefore estimate both a 
multivariate system and bivariate systems.24 
3.4 Empirical results 
We start out our empirical analysis by performing a multivariate Johansen test 
for all prices, i.e. the European and the US fishmeal and soyameal prices. The 
test is specified with four lags, a restricted intercept and 11 seasonal dummies. 
The intercept is restricted to only enter the long-run equations of the system.25 
An LM-test against autocorrelation up to the 12th order cannot be rejected for 
24 Recently, a number of studies have used cointegration analysis to investigating relationships between prices. 
Examples related to seafood products are Gordon, Salvanes and Atkins (1993), Bose and McIlgrom (1996), 
Gordon and Hannesson (1996), Asche, Salvanes and Steen (1997), Asche and Sebulonsen (1998) and 
Asche, Bremnes and Wessells (1999). 
25 A likelihood ratio test for whether a trend should be allowed in the short-run dynamics is distributed as 
χ2(1) with a critical value of 3.84 at a 5% level. With a test statistic of 0.02 we cannot reject the null 
hypothesis that the trend should be excluded. 
the system with four lags.26 Hence, four lags seem sufficient to include all 
dynamics. However, we cannot reduce the lag length further without getting 
problems with dynamic misspecification. The results from the multivariate test 
are reported in Table 2. 
Table 2: Multivariate Johansen Tests of Fishmeal and Soyameal Prices 
Ho: Max test 95% critical value Trace test 95% critical value 
p==0 55.82** 28.1 112.2** 53.1 
p<=1 33.99** 22.0  56.38** 34.9 
p<=2 13.84 15.7  22.39* 20.0 
p<=3   8.65   9.2    8.65   9.2 
* indicates significant at a 5% significance level while ** indicates significant at a 1%
significance level. 
The trace test indicates 3 cointegration vectors at the 5% level. The max test 
suggests two cointegration vectors at a 5% significance level, but with three at a 
10% significance level. Adopting the rank 3 model, we test for the LOP, which 
yields a test statistic of χ2(3)=8.33 that rejects the null of the LOP at the 4% 
level. Hence while the test rejects at the conventional (5%) level, evidence 
against the LOP is not compelling. 
Given the El Niños and the increased demand for fishmeal from aquaculture in 
our data sample, parameter stability is also of interest. Clements and Hendry 
(1995) and Hendry (1995) argue that most parameter changes are in the 
intercept, so checking constancy of the constant term should be the focus of 
tests for parameter stability. In dynamic models like ours, this might also be 
important since if one is to investigate parameter stability for all parameters, 
one increases substantially the likelihood for dimensionality problems. We will 
therefore follow this approach and test against a structural break in the constant 
terms in January 1991, which is approximately mid sample. By choosing mid-
sample as a break point we get two El Niños in each of the samples. The test is 
distributed as F(3,185) and gives a test statistic of 1.32 with a p-value of 
0.2649. Hence, this test does not provide any evidence against the null 
hypothesis of no structural break. 
The results from the bivariate cointegration tests are reported in Table 3. The 
variables are denoted as Fish_Ham and Soya_Ham for fishmeal and soyameal 
prices reported from Hamburg, Fish_Atl for fishmeal prices in Atlanta and 
Soya_Dec for soyameal prices in Decatur. The max test and the trace test both 
give evidence of one cointegrating vector for all pairs of prices. Hence, these 
tests also indicate that there is one stochastic trend in the system. 
26 The LM test for autocorrelation up to the 12th order is distributed as F(112,622), and gives a test statistic of 
1.02 with a p-value of 0.445. 
Table 3: Bivariate Cointegration Tests with 4 Lags. 
Variable 1 Variable 2 Max test 
p==0  
Max 
test 
p<=1 
Trace 
test 
p==0 
Trace 
test 
p<=1 
LOP 
(p-
values) 
Auto-
corr-
elation 
Fish_Ham Fish_Atl 20.71** 7.336 28.05** 7.336 0.0466* 0.1651 
Fish_Ham Soya_Ham 20.13* 8.394 28.53** 8.394 0.4991 0.2270 
Fish_Ham Soya_Dec 17.74* 6.479 24.22* 6.479 0.3402 0.6923 
Fish_Atl Soya_Ham 49.69** 7.001 56.69** 7.001 0.7688 0.5811 
Fish_Atl Soya_Dec 58.24** 6.261 64.5** 6.261 0.8349 0.4313 
Soya_Ham Soya_Dec 26.14** 6.839 32.98** 6.389 0.0590 0.0818 
* indicates significant at a 5% significance level while ** indicates significant at a 1%
significance level. 
Tests for the LOP from the bivariate Johansen tests are also reported in Table 3. 
All but one test do not reject the LOP hypothesis at a 5% level, while one test 
barely rejects the null hypothesis at a 5% level as the p-value is 0.047. 
Somewhat surprisingly, this is the test of the relationship between the two 
fishmeal prices. This might suggest that the different regional markets for 
fishmeal may be less integrated than the markets for the better storable 
commodity, soyameal. This result is still somewhat surprising since with the 
link between fishmeal and soyameal in each of the markets and the link between 
the soyameal markets, transitivity suggests that the LOP should also hold for the 
fishmeal markets. However, it is worthwhile noting that this is most likely the 
relationship that causes the possible deviations against the LOP in the 
multivariate test. 
We can conclude that the cointegration tests indicate that the four prices follow 
the same stochastic trend. Accordingly, fishmeal and soyameal compete in the 
same market. Moreover, the LOP seems to hold (or at least is very close to 
holding) as the evidence against it is not very strong. This implies that long-
term relationships between these prices, the relative prices, is constant, and 
therefore that the generalised composite commodity theorem holds. These 
results suggest that fishmeal and soyameal are strong substitutes. It is therefore 
the total demand for fish and soyameal, possibly together with the demand for 
other protein meals that determines the price of these protein meals. In order for 
aquaculture to influence the price of fishmeal with this market structure, the 
changes in demand or supply must be large enough to affect demand and supply 
for fish- and soyameal combined. This is important, since with such a market 
structure, it is unlikely that increased demand for fishmeal from the aquaculture 
sector will lead to increased prices for fishmeal, since it has only a negligible 
share of the protein meal market. It therefore seems unlikely that increased 
demand for fishmeal from the aquaculture sector will increase fishing pressure 
in industrial fisheries. 
4. Concluding remarks
Increased demand for fishmeal from a growing aquaculture sector has the 
potential to increase fishing pressure in reduction fisheries. It does, however, 
require that the fisheries are poorly managed (or not managed at all) and that 
there are no close substitutes for fishmeal. The most important reduction 
fisheries operating internationally can be described as regulated open access. If 
this management regime is efficient, increased demand from aquaculture does 
not pose a threat to the fish stocks. However, there are many indications that 
quotas are set higher than biological recommendations and that quotas might be 
over-fished. With such a situation one might not be too far from open access. If 
so, increased demand for fishmeal may well increase fishing pressure. 
Poor fisheries management is not sufficient to cause increased fishing pressure 
in these circumstances. In addition, there must not be any close substitutes for 
fishmeal, since close substitutes would alleviate the demand pressure on the 
market for marine proteins and consequently the fisheries. Our analysis 
indicates that fishmeal is part of the large protein meal market, and, in 
particular, that fishmeal is a close substitute to soyameal. With such a market 
structure it is first and foremost total supply and demand for protein meals; of 
which fishmeal makes up a mere 4%, that determines prices for fishmeal. One is 
then led to the conclusion that increased demand for fishmeal from aquaculture 
cannot have had any significant impact on fishmeal prices. 
Our results indicate that increased demand for fishmeal cannot have led to 
increased fishing pressure in reduction fisheries. Poultry and pig producers, who 
switch to cheaper vegetable protein sources, counteract aquaculture’s increasing 
demand for marine proteins, leading to a spillover demand from the fishmeal 
market to the larger vegetable protein markets. This situation can change if 
aquaculture production continues to grow. Aquaculture’s demand for fishmeal 
has grown from basically nothing to 35% of total production in only twenty 
years. If this trend continues demand for fishmeal may become more inelastic, 
leading to higher fishmeal prices. It is unclear, however, how essential fishmeal 
will be for aquaculture production as new feed technologies reduce the 
dependencies on marine proteins in aquaculture feeds. What remains clear is 
that increased fishmeal demand from aquaculture has not negatively impacted 
the stocks targeted in reduction fisheries so far. Furthermore, the only measure 
that can ensure that it continues to stay this way is good fisheries management. 
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